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SEA POWER IN THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
John Nash

T

he Peloponnesian War (431–404 BCE) was one of the defining conflicts of
the ancient Greek world. It involved almost all the Greek city-states, aligned
with one of the two main protagonists, Athens and Sparta. Conventionally it is
seen as a war between a great land power, Sparta, and a great sea power, Athens.
The effect of viewing the war in this way is to give less prominence to the place
of sea power in the conduct of the war, with that element viewed as relevant to
only one side. Many scholars acknowledge that Athenian war strategy was primarily a maritime strategy and that Sparta only defeated Athens once the former
had embraced the use of sea power against the latter. This is the basic narrative,
and it is essentially correct. However, there is little appraisal of how sea power
was used in the conduct of the war. This is unfortunate, since the Peloponnesian
War is an excellent example of the uses and effectiveness of sea power. A more
thorough examination of the thirty-year war beJohn Nash is a PhD candidate in the Centre for Clastween Sparta and Athens and their respective allies
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(ANU), in Canberra, having completed a bachelor’s reveals a conflict in which sea power was of critical
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importance.
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along the full spectrum of maritime operations.
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naval operations commonly are divided into three
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ponnesian War makes clear that, even at that time,
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naval forces conducted operations that spanned these three basic categories in
ways that are recognizable to the modern observer.
These categories are not intended to be prescriptive, and naval operations often span several different tasks; current Chinese antipiracy operations in the Gulf
of Aden can be seen as both constabulary and diplomatic in nature, for instance.
What these categories aid in illustrating is the many and varied operations that
navies conduct and how sea power is used, and used differently, by various powers and with different strategies in place.
The strategy of Athens under the leadership of the statesman Pericles was conspicuously and unambiguously maritime in nature. Under his leadership, Athens
would import all its required foodstuffs, avoid land battle with the dreaded
Spartan phalanx, and conduct amphibious operations against Spartan territory.
Athenian war strategy changed significantly in the second half of the Peloponnesian War (413–404 BCE), but it nevertheless remained a maritime strategy.2
This portion of the struggle commonly and misleadingly is referred to as the
Decelean War, but the Ionian War is a more appropriate term. The fortification
of Decelea in Attica did separate Athens from a large part of its countryside and
cut off the land route to the critically important island of Euboea, and this fortification did define to a strong degree Athenian and Spartan strategy for the final
years of the war. However, the actual conduct of the war was carried out almost
entirely in the eastern Aegean and up to the Hellespont (Dardanelles) region. It
was a war defined by maritime operations: the interdiction of trade; diplomatic
coercion; amphibious operations; and pitched naval battles, on both a small and
a large scale. Examining these operations provides a better picture of how the war
was conducted and brings its truly maritime nature to the fore, allowing the value
of studying this period to be appreciated fully.
SEA POWER AND TECHNOLOGY
Before examining maritime and naval operations in the Peloponnesian War, it is
important to address the issue of technology and the limitations imposed on naval forces of the period. Too many scholars, of both classical history and modern
strategic thought, consider technology to have been so primitive as to render the
study of maritime strategy in ancient history pointless. Chapter titles found in
some works clearly demonstrate the poor regard in which some hold the naval
operations of this era (e.g., “The Pre-naval Era” [James Cable]; “Land Warfare
Afloat: Before 1650” [Michael A. Palmer]).3
Palmer especially makes sweeping statements about the technological effectiveness of ancient fleets, most notably that it was only with the advent of European sailing navies that states sought to command the seas by destroying enemy
fleets.4 Yet the fifth-century BCE naval battles of Salamis, Mycale, Arginusae, and
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/8
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Aegospotami involved fleet actions aimed at removing the opposing fleet from
the sea—with some or a complete measure of success. Also worthy of mention
are the numerous battles fought during the third-century BCE First Punic War
between Carthage and Rome, most notably the battle of the Aegates Islands, a
naval battle that effectively decided the outcome of the war in Rome’s favor, with
widespread and long-lasting consequences, especially with regard to the Second
Punic War. Roman sea power ensured that the general Hannibal had to walk to
Italy rather than go by sea.5 Palmer’s assertion is limited severely in both time and
space, seeming to posit sea command theory as a European, Enlightenment-era
phenomenon. An assertion as sweeping as Palmer’s is not backed by historical
evidence, and the Peloponnesian War example is an effective corrective.
As the debate raged over whether Sparta and its allies should go to war with
Athens, the historian Thucydides has the Corinthians pushing for war, writing,
“A single defeat at sea is in all likelihood their [Athens’s] ruin.”6 Whether this
was a genuine Corinthian view or an Athenian fear that Thucydides projected
through a speech is immaterial to this particular argument. Irrespective of viewpoint, the idea that the war in general, not just the war at sea, could be resolved
in one great fleet action was clearly in evidence 2,500 years ago. The historian
Diodorus Siculus states that late in the war, in approximately 410, the Spartans
thought that for them to lose at sea constituted no more than a setback, since they
were still supreme on land, but that defeat at sea for Athens would result in that
city fighting for its very survival.7 Indeed, by that stage of the war the Athenians
were clinging on to a fragile empire, with their resources severely depleted, while
Sparta’s “center of gravity,” the Peloponnese, was safe from the depredations of
the Athenians.8
This line of thinking on decisive battle has a striking parallel in the early
twentieth century and the First World War. It is reminiscent of the German naval
strategy under Admiral Tirpitz of a “risk fleet”: the idea that the inferior German
High Seas Fleet could catch a portion of the Royal Navy’s Grand Fleet and defeat
it, thus—with one grand battle—altering the balance of naval power in favor of
Germany.9 The Athenians in 480 were able to erode the Persian fleet’s fighting
ability at Artemisium, admittedly with the help of a storm, and soon after at Salamis were able to defeat the Persians at sea, making the decisive land battle at Plataea possible and thus saving Greece.10 The aforementioned Corinthian speech is
an explicit expression of decisive naval battle as a conscious strategy. Taken with
the Persian Wars example, the Corinthian and Spartan examples show that over
a 2,500-year period, the concept of a “Mahanian” battle at sea to determine the
outcome of a war remained an appealing and viable strategy with roots in the
classical Greek era.11
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The purpose here is not to disregard technological limitations or minimize
the importance of technology, but to illustrate the enduring nature of some basic
tenets of naval warfare and maritime strategy. Technological limitations often are
used to justify a view that navies of the time could not participate in any contest
for control of the sea. Cable criticizes Mahan’s exploration of sea control during
the Second Punic War, writing that Mahan does not mention the very limited
sea-keeping capacities of Roman galleys or their dependence on coast hugging as
almost their sole mode of navigation—as if these aspects had any bearing on the
concept of sea control.12 The basic fact of the matter was that the Romans could
do what they wanted at sea and the Carthaginians were restricted severely in their
ability to use the sea for their own purposes—as clear an example of control of
the sea as any other throughout history.13 Sea control should be thought of as a
relative concept, not an absolute one.
SEA CONTROL
The concept of sea control is certainly in evidence during the Peloponnesian War,
despite the restrictions of technology. In the second year of the war, Thucydides
has Pericles console the people of Athens, telling them that there are two domains, land and sea, and that the Athenians hold sway over the sea—not only
as they are doing so at present, but to whatever extent they think fit. Moreover,
“your naval resources are such that your vessels may go where they please, without the [Persian] king or any other nation on earth being able to stop them.”14
This was a bold assertion, and one made in the context of a political speech to the
Athenian population; yet the basic premise was correct. Events of the year had
demonstrated that the Athenians could sail where and when they wanted. There
were some exceptions, such as the virtually unopposed Spartan raid on Salamis,
which caused a panic in Piraeus, but this helps demonstrate a basic tenet of sea
control: it is limited in time and space.15 While technological considerations precluded what might be called “sea command” from being exercised, this is true of
most times in the history of naval warfare.16 The state of sea control throughout
the war passed from Athenian control of the sea, to a contested sea, and finally
to Spartan control of the sea. Moreover, as Pericles’s speech illustrates, the idea
of navies being able to establish sea control at this time was a conscious strategic
concept. Again, that these changes in sea control are readily apparent invalidates
arguments that such concepts were not present in the classical world.
The ultimate role of navies, both past and present, is to fight and win at sea.
Although naval battles may occur infrequently, all other roles that navies undertake are dependent on the ability to fight and win against an enemy. There is little
possibility of conducting amphibious operations, diplomatic coercion, or trade
protection if a naval force cannot prevail over an enemy in battle. This principle
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/8
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is demonstrated amply throughout the Peloponnesian War. Athens’s ability to
prevail in battles at sea allowed it to gain and maintain sea control.
THE STRATEGY OF PERICLES AND HIS SUCCESSORS
Athenian strategy under Pericles has been the source of much debate and misconception. It was a maritime strategy and it was a defensive strategy. Athens was
fortified with walls, both those around the city itself and the long constructions
that ran down to the port of Piraeus. This effectively sealed off Athens from enemies; siege warfare of the time relied primarily on a besieging force starving the
city out or being let in by forces within the city. It was not until the era of Philip of
Macedon in the fourth century that siege weapons developed to a point at which
besieging forces could threaten the walls of a city directly. Able to import all the
food it required, Athens was a metaphorical island—a concept pushed by Pericles
and the unidentified author referred to as “the Old Oligarch.”17 With the safety of
the city almost guaranteed and its supply lines assured, Athens could strike out
at Sparta and Spartan allies using superior sea power.
The strategy of Pericles was an evolution of the strategy developed by
those who had come before him, back to Themistocles and the Persian Wars.
Thucydides sees Themistocles as the one who spurred Athens into becoming
a sea power, thereby laying the foundations of the Athenian empire. This was
because Themistocles in 478 had the Athenians rebuild their city walls, as well as
the long walls connecting the city to the town and port of Piraeus. He allegedly
advised the Athenians that if they were ever to find themselves hard pressed by
land, they should go down to Piraeus and defy the world with their fleet. Before
the battle of Salamis in 480, a Corinthian delegate attacked Themistocles’s counsel, dismissing him because Athens had been evacuated and thus he did not even
have a city to his name. Themistocles replied that not only did he have a city, but
he had one even greater than the Corinthians—so long as the Athenians had 250
ships fully manned.18 Athens’s decision to rebuild the city’s walls caused anxiety
in Sparta, although it was Sparta’s allies that allegedly instigated the Spartans to
confront Athens, because they feared the Athenian navy and the valor the Athenians had displayed against Persia.19 It is noteworthy that Thucydides maintains
that it was Sparta’s allies who were most concerned, for these allies were nearer to
the coast than Sparta itself, and therefore more vulnerable to Athenian sea power.
Plutarch put it bluntly in his biography of Themistocles, writing that he “fastened
the city to the Piraeus and the land to the sea.”20
The walls of Athens were important to defense against Spartan and other
hoplites, but, as Themistocles supposedly made clear to the other Greeks, it was
the fleet that formed the basis of Athenian power from the Persian Wars onward.
At this early stage, it was a defensive strategy, although the Athenians engaged
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in various overseas campaigns before the Peloponnesian War. However, with the
Delian League slowly morphing into the Athenian empire, the Athenians found
themselves able to draw on vast resources. This solidified Athenian strategy,
which is illustrated clearly in the fifth-century work of the Old Oligarch. The
first point he makes is about Athenian hoplites: although they may be no match
for their enemies, they are still stronger than their tribute-paying allies—and
that was sufficient.21 It is a strong indication that the Athenians did not intend
to use their land forces to confront their enemies directly in pitched battle—
making it all the more clear that Athens’s grand strategy was a maritime one.22
The city-state’s land army need only be stronger than that of any of the allied
states. Even so, if the need arose the Athenians could use this inferior force in
a superior way: their navy could land a superior force of troops wherever they
wished. The author notes that “it is possible for the rulers of the sea to sometimes
do as land powers do, to ravage the land of the stronger; for it is possible to sail
about wherever there is no enemy or wherever they are few, and to embark to sail
away as the enemy approaches.”23 During the Peloponnesian War, Athenian raids
on the Peloponnese demonstrated this many times. The author is highlighting
the mobility of Athenian land forces. There was no need for them to engage in a
futile and destructive hoplite battle to defend Attica.
As the Old Oligarch explains further, Athens exploited geography to its strategic advantage. Land powers could band together easily, whereas the sea separated
islands geographically. Athens controlled this sea, and even if it failed initially to
prevent the islanders from coming together, it still could cut them off from outside supplies and starve them out.24 The infamous threat leveled against Melos
during the Peloponnesian War was made with the understanding that Athens’s
navy could cut off and invade the small island without outside interference. As
for the mainland cities, Athens ruled over them by fear. This was not because of
a superior land army, but through a combination of Athens being able to control
the flow of imports and exports and the superior mobility granted by its strong
navy.25 Athens’s sea power, in theory and practice, became primarily an offensive
force in the lead-up to the Peloponnesian War.
The separation of the operational from the strategic level of war aids in clarifying Athenian strategy during the first part of the Peloponnesian War, known
as the Archidamian War. This requires caution, as there are no definite lines
between these two levels, and the Peloponnesian War has received no such
examination from scholars of either the classical world or modern military
theory.26 Nevertheless, it is a useful way to examine the war without conflating
policy, strategy, and operations. At its core, strategy is about “maintaining a balance between ends, ways, and means; about identifying objectives; and about the
resources and methods available for meeting such objectives.”27 Under Pericles’s
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/8
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strategy, Athens was a city protected from land attack, with a powerful navy capable of power projection and an empire that provided a huge amount of capital
with which to fund a maritime war, which would end with the continuation of the
status quo ante bellum. The campaigns that Athens launched against the Peloponnese can be seen as the operational level of war: the precise ways in which Athens
used means—sea power—to achieve its desired ends; in short, strategy in action.
The strategy of Pericles did not, as Donald Kagan claims, fail; the successors of
Pericles maintained essentially the same strategy, but pursued it more vigorously
and more aggressively on an operational level.28 Pericles’s strategy was one of
projecting maritime power as a means of coercing Sparta into peace, a strategy
that ultimately succeeded in 421 with the Peace of Nicias, however imperfect
Thucydides considered that peace to be.29
The opening of the war saw both Sparta and Athens initiate their war plans.
Sparta invaded Attica in the hope of drawing out and defeating the incensed
Athenian hoplites, while Athens gathered its allies and prepared a hundred ships
for a raid on the Peloponnese.30 Kagan’s summary of the first year of the war has
the Spartans doing widespread damage and the Athenians expending considerable time and money for little gain.31 Henry D. Westlake and John F. Lazenby
also conclude that the Spartans inflicted more damage on Attica than the Athenians did in return.32 These are poor assessments of the events of that first year,
both overestimating the damage the Spartans inflicted and grossly simplifying
and underestimating the damage Athens inflicted. There is little doubt that the
Spartans’ invasion of Attica and their despoliation of the land upset Athenians
greatly; Thucydides says so.33 However, the invasion and ravaging of Attica
made the Athenians more angry and resolute than despairing, and it certainly
demonstrated to the Spartans that their ravaging strategy would not induce the
Athenians into any rash actions.34 It also assumes a negligible effort by Athens to
defend Attica, which was not the case. As small as it might have been, Athens’s
effort to defend Attica with cavalry both boosted morale and limited the damage that the cavalry-deficient Spartan army could inflict.35 Many scholars have
exaggerated the effects of Spartan efforts during the first year of the war, perhaps
because the traditional nature of Spartan land invasion makes it appear more effective compared with the more unorthodox Athenian maritime strategy.
On the first point, instances of ravaging during this period appear to have been
greatly exaggerated regarding their material effects. In his groundbreaking work
Warfare and Agriculture in Classical Greece, Victor Davis Hanson quite convincingly argues that the systematic destruction of crops and the ravaging of land are
extremely difficult. Grapevines and olive trees are extremely hardy and therefore
difficult to destroy; doing so requires many hours. Further, grain is vulnerable to
fire and other destruction only during a narrow time window. These conclusions
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stem from practical experience in farming, as well as from close reading of
the relevant literature. Of particular importance is a passage in the Hellenica
Oxyrhynchia, in which the unknown author describes Attica before the Spartan
fortification of Decelea as the most lavishly equipped part of Greece, having suffered only slight damage from the Spartans in previous attacks.36 Thucydides too
describes the fortification of Decelea as one of the prime causes of Athenian ruin,
in stark contrast to the invasions of the Archidamian War.37 This should not be a
surprise, since Hanson calculates that the Spartans spent a total of only 150 days
in Attica during the entire Archidamian War.38 The idea that Sparta laid waste to
Attica is hard to defend and the effectiveness of this Spartan strategy is overstated.
Sparta’s original strategy was ultimately a failure, and it was only when Sparta
embraced sea power that it defeated Athens—not in the fields of Attica, but on
the seas from which Athens derived its power.39
In contrast, Athens’s accomplishments during the first year of the war were
strategically significant, as it used sea power to strengthen its position greatly.
The Athenians, along with a contingent of fifty ships from Corcyra and other
allies, conducted their own ravaging of enemy territory. This raiding included an
attack on the city of Methone in the helot homeland of Messenia, a strike into an
area where the Spartans felt particularly vulnerable. Although the Athenians did
not take the city, the attack clearly worried the Spartans. Concurrently with this
operation, thirty Athenian ships raided farther north into Locris, taking hostages
and defeating the Locrians who assembled there to resist them. Finally, the Athenians secured the islands of Aegina and Cephalonia, the latter taken without a
fight.40 Occupation of the former island ensured the security of the Saronic Gulf,
and control of the latter helped secure a base off the west coast of the Peloponnese and Acarnania.
It is arguable that by the end of the first year of the war the Athenians had done
as much material damage to the Spartans as the Spartans had to the Athenians.41
Plutarch goes so far as to write that not only did Athenian raids on the Peloponnese cause more damage than the Spartan ones on Attica, but if the plague had
not occurred the Spartans would have given up entirely.42 Far more important,
and often overlooked by scholars, is the fact that Athens had accomplished far
more than the Spartans in solidifying and improving its strategic position in
Greece, as well as proving the capability and reach of Athenian sea power.
The offshore Greek islands were important strategic locations, and both sides
targeted them. The Ambrakiots convinced the Spartans that conquering Acarnania would lead to the taking of the islands of Zakynthos and Cephalonia, possession of which would make Athenian cruises around the Peloponnese much more
difficult.43 Corcyra not only possessed a strong navy, but was situated on the best
sailing route from Greece to Italy. Athens’s and Sparta’s respective interference in
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/8

Winter2018Review.indb 126

8

11/1/17 9:56 AM

Nash: Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War

NA S H

127

Corcyrean affairs was aimed not at conquest but at establishing a friendly government that would secure the island for their interests, especially control of the sea
lines of communication (SLOCs). An Athenian attack on the island of Kythera
in 424 had a twofold purpose. First, the island was a landing place for merchant
ships sailing from Libya and Egypt. Second, the island was in a position from
which Laconia could be secured from attacks by “privateers,” which made it an
excellent place for the Athenians to set up a base from which to raid the Peloponnese.44 There is also the matter of money, as the Athenians were able to exact a
tribute of four talents from Kythera, an important Spartan-allied city. This was
not a departure from Athens’s original strategy, as Kagan claims, but a change in
the operational conduct of the war.45 Athens still was using sea power offensively,
attacking the Peloponnese and wearing down Sparta.
The culmination of the Periclean strategy was the Athenian success at Pylos
and the capture of Spartan forces on the island of Sphacteria in 425. Thucydides
labels the end result a stroke of enormous luck. Although luck certainly contributed to Athenian success, the matter should be seen not so simply, but as the
fruition of Athenian maritime strategy.46 Once again Kagan is incorrect in calling Demosthenes’s strategy a clear departure from previous Athenian strategy.47
Although it is true, as he points out, that Pericles had mentioned establishing
fortifications in the Peloponnese but never did so, Pericles’s death not long into
the war means we cannot know whether the idea was only a vague and empty
threat.48 Demosthenes’s decision to fortify Pylos demonstrates a continued, albeit
belated, plan to increase pressure on Sparta through raids and attacks on its territory from the sea. Two modern scholars quite correctly interpret the Pylos campaign as the logical corollary of the Periclean strategy.49 Although Thucydides
writes that it was owing to a storm that the Athenians ended up at Pylos, he also
states that it was the location where Demosthenes landed to “do what was wanted
there” and to fortify the position, as that was the object of the voyage. This was
not a random, deserted headland, as Thucydides has the two Athenian generals
sneeringly say; it was territory in the heart of Messenia, among the helot population that was such a constant worry to Sparta.50 The original Athenian plan, as
Pericles had described it, was unchanged, merely pursued more aggressively at
the operational level.
The Athenian decision to fortify Pylos quickly got the attention of the Spartans. Once King Agis II and the Peloponnesians ravaging Attica heard the news,
they marched back immediately, and once in Sparta they called together allies
from around the Peloponnese.51 Once the Spartans attacked the Athenian garrison on Pylos, they made the fateful decision to land a force of hoplites on the
island of Sphacteria to prevent any Athenian relieving force from establishing a
base nearby.52 The subsequent naval battle, in which Athens was victorious, also
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018
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had the effect of trapping the Spartan hoplites occupying Sphacteria. This situation was deemed so dire that the Spartan commanders resolved to conclude a
truce on the spot. In fact, the Spartans felt the situation so serious that as part
of the truce they temporarily surrendered to the Athenians all their warships in
Laconia, sixty in total.53 The Spartans were willing to gut their naval power, weak
as it already was, to retain their small contingent of men. This shows a lack of
Spartan confidence with respect to naval matters, and it demonstrates clearly the
Athenian amphibious capability. Athenian land and naval forces could be used
in close concert not just to raid territory, but to deal a serious military blow to
Sparta, one with severe political consequences.
The full magnitude of Athenian accomplishments during the Pylos campaign
is evident in Spartan actions after the capture of their hoplites on Sphacteria.
Thucydides calls the surrender of the (approximately) 120 Spartiates the most
surprising thing to happen in the war.54 The most immediate result of the Spartans being taken prisoner was the Athenian threat to execute them if the Spartans
invaded Attica, thus ending the direct threat to Attica and freeing it up for full
use.55 The Spartans sent envoys to Athens to recover both the prisoners and Pylos, for they were seriously alarmed by the Messenian raids being conducted from
Pylos into Laconia, as they stoked the age-old fear of widespread helot rebellion.56
The Athenians did not stop their naval operations of 425 with Pylos. They
raided Crommyon in Corinthian territory and established a fortified base at
Methana from which they could raid into the territory of Troezen.57 In the northwest the Athenians based in Naupactus made an expedition against Anactorion, a
Corinthian-controlled city, taking it and settling people from Acarnania there.58
This meant that the entire north coast of the Corinthian Gulf from Naupactus to
Ambracia, with the minor exception of Molycreion, was hostile to Corinth. These
widespread amphibious operations demonstrate a powerful Athenian maritime,
and especially naval, capability and a strategy that was aggressively expeditionary
in nature.
Thucydides gives a very blunt assessment of the events described above, and
of their effects on Sparta as well. The Spartans split their forces and stationed
them throughout the most threatened areas of the Peloponnese, and took the
unusual step of raising a force of cavalry and archers to act as a mobile reserve.
Thucydides describes the Spartans as on the defensive, fearing internal revolution, afraid of another disaster like the one that had befallen them at Pylos, and
lacking all confidence in themselves.59 The cause of this anxiety and outright fear
was constant, unimpeded Athenian raiding along the Peloponnesian seaboard.60
This scourge was made possible by a strong Athenian navy that could land a force
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of troops in hostile territory, protect them from enemy naval intervention, and
bring them off again safely or keep them supplied and protected so they could
cause even greater damage.
Although Pericles’s strategy essentially remained in play throughout the first
decade of the war, there were departures from it as the war expanded into new areas such as Sicily and the Chalcidice region. Nevertheless, these campaigns were
also expeditionary in nature, relying heavily on naval force to project power into
coastal and island regions. The first expedition to Sicily constituted a departure
from Pericles’s strategy, although the ostensible aim was not conquest but the
provision of aid to Athens’s Sicilian allies. Thucydides does give the Athenians a
more sinister motive, calling the expedition a test of how vulnerable Sicily might
be to Athenian conquest, but this interpretation should be viewed with caution.61
The first Sicilian expedition was primarily diplomatic in nature, and Thucydides
perhaps downplays the importance of the Athenians’ attempts at aiding their
western allies. After all, the Peloponnesians had strong friends in the west too,
and for Athens to ignore its allies’ call for help would have weakened its position
in the west, if not in the other territories where it had allies. Because failure to
aid its allies would have made Athens look weak, the dispatch of a naval expedition to Sicily in 427 can be seen as a response to external events rather than as a
radical change in the conduct of the war and Athens’s strategy, if not policy. As
the war dragged on, it became more complex, and these instances highlight the
ever-important point that strategy is not practiced in a vacuum.
Spartan operations in the Chalcidice region in the later years of the Archidamian War mark a change in Sparta’s strategy that reveals the effectiveness of
Athenian strategy up to that point. Thucydides explicitly states that Spartan operations in the northwest Aegean were aimed at distracting Athens and relieving
the pressure it was putting on the Peloponnese, Laconia in particular. Further
and even more importantly, Thucydides writes that the Spartans were happy to
have an excuse to send out helots from the Peloponnese, since the occupation of
Pylos was thought to have increased the chances of a helot revolt.62 It also marks
the point at which Sparta abandoned all hope of confronting Athens at sea until
well after the Peace of Nicias, for it decided to avoid naval operations in favor
of a purely land campaign. However, Spartan success in the northwest Aegean
presaged a bolder and more successful strategy to be undertaken during the
Decelean/Ionian War, when Sparta would use Persian money to build a fleet and
conduct its own amphibious operations against the Athenians in the Ionian island and Anatolian regions. Sparta recognized that the most effective strategy for
victory was to separate Athens from its allies, by force or otherwise. This strategy
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was tested and found to be successful during the campaigns in the Chalcidice
region, but it could not be executed after the failure of the Mytilinean revolt and
Pylos campaigns eroded and ultimately destroyed Spartan naval capabilities.
OPERATIONS OUTSIDE OF BATTLE
Diplomacy
He [Pericles] displayed their power to the barbarian tribes living around
and to the kings and lords the power and the confidence and impunity
with which they sailed where they wished, having made all of the sea
subject to their control.
PLUTARCH, LIFE OF PERICLES

Naval forces have many roles outside of war and combat operations, foremost
among them in diplomacy. Diplomatic tasks range from furnishing allies with
moral and physical support to coercion, and all these roles fell within the scope
of action of Greek maritime forces during the Peloponnesian War. Navies were—
and still are—uniquely placed to act as diplomatic tools; armies are inherently
intrusive, whereas navies can remain at a distance, threatening or reassuring as
desired without instigating hostilities.
The Plutarch passage quoted above details an Athenian expedition that
Pericles conducted in approximately 436 and that is an excellent example of the
use of naval force for diplomatic purposes. The fleet’s presence off the coast of
the Aegean Islands and Black Sea region demonstrated the Athenians’ potential
power to friend and foe alike, without actually encroaching on any territory or
engaging in a hostile act. The Peloponnesian War involved many different protagonists spread throughout the Mediterranean, and most of them were within
reach of the sea, providing a city with the opportunity to aid or menace with its
navy as it saw fit, exercising both soft and hard diplomacy.
Pericles’s show of force in 436 was aimed at Greeks and foreigners alike,
powers with which they were at peace at the time. As Plutarch understands, it
was more than a matter of simply sailing a large body of warships around; the
real point of the exercise was to demonstrate Athenian sea control. The ships
displayed naval and military power in a region distant from Athens, with the implication that the Athenians could project this power anywhere and at any time,
thus enjoying the power, confidence, and impunity to sail where they wished,
“having made all of the sea subject to their control.”63 This was no idle threat,
for the opening years of the Peloponnesian War demonstrated that the Athenian
fleet indeed could sail where it wished and land troops in strategically significant
areas. Further, Plutarch writes that Pericles did many things to please the people,
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including “sending out sixty triremes each and every year, in which many of
the citizens were sailing for eight months being paid.”64 This acted as an annual
demonstration of Athenian sea power to the Aegean world. Some scholars believe
that sixty ships is too large a number, pointing out that it would have incurred
too great an annual cost; but, regardless of numbers, it remains an example of the
frequent use of Athens’s navy for diplomatic purposes.65 Russell Meiggs suggests
that the main function of the fleet in peacetime was as a police force, with the
threefold duty of showing the flag, instilling confidence in the hearts of friends,
and suppressing piracy.66 Although correctly identifying the roles, he mistakenly
identifies the first two as constabulary operations, when they are in fact diplomatic ones—the two most prominent and important diplomatic roles that navies
undertake. The ultimate goal of such posturing was to establish in the minds of
friend and foe alike the Athenian capacity and will to control the seas. Athenian
power and influence were extended across the regions through the use of naval
forces in a diplomatic role.67
An episode that occurred at the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War neatly
demonstrates the diplomatic use of sea power. Athens decided to conclude a
defensive treaty with the island state of Corcyra in 433; both Thucydides and
Plutarch write that Athens needed to aid Corcyra, lest its naval power go over
to Athens’s rival, Corinth.68 Athens sent ten ships to aid Corcyra. Especially
noteworthy was the inclusion of three strategoi to command the contingent.69
Considering that Athens elected ten strategoi for each year, three is a high level
of command for such a small number of ships; a later raid on the Peloponnese
during the first year of the war involving a hundred ships had the same number of
strategoi.70 Indeed, the three commanders sent to Corcyra were under very strict
instructions to do nothing that might provoke Corinth or lead to a violation of
the treaty Athens had with it, but to prevent an incursion into Corcyraean territory. Athens sent out a tightly controlled force of ships to aid an ally, Corcyra,
while simultaneously making a show of force and a demonstration of Athenian
resolve in the face of Corinthian aggression. Kagan puts it best when he describes
this maneuver as less a military than a diplomatic one.71
The contention that the Athenian orders were unrealistic misses the point
that it was a diplomatic rather than a military use of sea power.72 It was the presence of Athenian ships to begin with, as opposed to their number, that was the
entire point, and the fact that three strategoi commanded them shows the delicate
nature of the task. From the outset of political tensions, Athens employed naval
force as a diplomatic tool. That Pericles did not go with the force is perhaps a
good indication that the other Athenian leaders clearly understood his aims.
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Trade Protection and Interdiction
The protection and interdiction of trade have been among the prime duties of navies throughout history, and the conduct of such operations during the Peloponnesian War was critical to its outcome. Both sides engaged in the protection of
their own and the interdiction of enemy seaborne trade, although it was Athens
that had the most to lose from an interruption of trade. Operations ranged from
the employment of “privateers” and direct attacks on shipping to the control of
vital SLOCs. These operations are not as well documented as the other maritime
operations undertaken during the war, either in the ancient sources or by modern
scholars, but they remained vital, and it was Athens’s inability to protect trade,
particularly in foodstuffs, that led to its surrender following blockade and starvation by Sparta.
In the second year of the war the Athenians sent six ships under a certain
Melesandros to the region of Caria and Lycia, located on the Anatolian coast.
Melesandros’s tasks were twofold: to collect tribute and to prevent “the Peloponnesian privateers” from attacking merchantmen.73 Both Richard Crawley and Rex
Warner, translators of two of the most popular editions of Thucydides, translate
leistikos in the above passage as privateer.74 However, leistikos usually is translated
as pirate or bandit, as the term was equally applicable to such activities on land
and sea. Labeling them privateers implies that the Spartans employed them to
attack only the shipping of Athens and Athenian allies.
In the first year of the war Athens had fortified the island of Atalante off
the Opuntian coast to prevent leistikoi from sailing out of Opus and the rest of
Locris and attacking Euboea.75 It was only with the outbreak of war that Athens
suddenly had found the need to fortify this particular position, suggesting that
piracy was not an enduring regional issue of concern to Athens. In this case, it
appears that Sparta engaged locals to privateer against the Athenians. Locris’s
position near Euboea—an island important for the support of Athens—made it a
good base of operations, yet the Spartans’ navy was so weak it was unlikely they
could establish their own base there: thus the need to gain the support of leistikoi.
As for direct attacks on trade, there is a vague reference to the Spartans attacking Athenian and allied traders at sea at the very beginning of the war, but the
narrative is quite unspecific and stands out most for highlighting the brutality
of the Spartans.76 A more detailed instance appears in 412/1, when the Spartan
Hippocrates was sent out with one Laconian and eleven Sicilian ships to Cnidus
on the Ionian coast. Half the ships were ordered to seize all merchant vessels
sailing from Egypt.77 However, the Athenians became aware of this and sent out
their own ships, which intercepted and captured the Peloponnesian ships. This
negated the threat to the merchant vessels, which presumably were carrying grain
to the Athenians in the region.78 In 410, the Spartan king Agis sent fifteen ships,
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manned by allies, to Chalcedon and Byzantium, and en route three of them were
destroyed in the Hellespont by the nine Athenian ships that were always present
to watch over merchantmen.79 These examples show that the Athenians were on
constant watch for threats to their merchant vessels and had mechanisms in place
for the wartime control of grain throughout the Aegean.80
The final way in which trade was attacked or protected was through the control of shipping routes—the vital SLOCs. Having established supremacy over the
waters of the Propontis (Sea of Marmara) after the victory at Cyzicus, Athens was
able to control the flow of shipping via this route and collect a tax on all vessels
sailing into the region from the Black Sea. King Agis summed up Spartan despair
at the Athenian control of grain routes. “But Agis, seeing [from Attica] the many
grain ships sailing into the Piraeus, was saying that it was of no advantage for
them [Sparta] to shut out the Athenians from the land for much time already, if
they could not hold back the grain imported by sea.”81
It was evident to the Spartans that, despite occupying Athenian territory in
Attica year-round, they could win only by cutting Athens off from its overseas
food supply. This was achieved best through control of Athens’s main SLOC,
which by the end of the war ran through the Bosporus and Hellespont. Black Sea
grain was critical to Athens, and had been possibly as far back as the late 430s.
The loss of Euboea in 411 was a disaster for Athens, not just because of the loss of
ships in the battle off Eretria, but for the loss of an important source of grain and
other supplies; Thucydides held that the island was of more value than Attica.82
Athens previously had imported grain from a range of different areas, but gradual
Spartan pressure eventually forced the Athenians into relying on importations
solely from the Black Sea region. By closing down the last available grain SLOC
to Athens, Sparta finally was able to starve Athens into submission.
LESSONS
The Peloponnesian War of 431–404 BCE was a maritime war, one characterized
by the constant use of sea power by Athens, Sparta, and their respective allies. The
lands surrounding the cities of both protagonists were not the scenes of great, or
even many, battles. From Sicily in the west to the Bosporus in the east, it was the
littoral areas, and especially the islands, that saw endemic warfare throughout
three decades of conflict. There were only two large-scale land battles during
this period, and none in which the full forces of the Athenians and Spartans were
involved. Soldiers certainly had their part to play in the Peloponnesian War, but
it was the ability to project power at and from the sea that was the determining
factor in the war.
At the core of Athenian strategy, from the very beginning of the war, was the
capability to project power ashore from the sea. Athenian ships cruising by the
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island or coastal city of a recalcitrant ally were effective diplomatically because it
was understood that they could cause serious damage. When it came to fighting
Sparta, the Athenians’ ability to raid the coast of the Peloponnese was central to
their war strategy, and one to which the Spartans had no effective response. Athenian attacks demonstrated that without a navy and in spite of Spartan attacks on
Attica, Sparta could not protect its allies from Athenian naval forces. The walls of
Athens protected the city from the vaunted Spartan hoplites, just as the seas and
Athenian triremes protected Athens’s allies. Maritime power projection by the
Athenians demonstrated the impotence of the Spartan land army, and raised the
specter of helot rebellion as well. The Athenian victory at Pylos and Sphacteria in
425 is the starkest example of these facts and was the vindication of the Periclean
strategy, regardless of how later politicians chose to exploit or throw away this
important victory. The Sicilian expedition was the largest amphibious operation
conducted to that time, and the operations conducted at sea had a critical impact
on the fate of the expedition—in the Corinthian Gulf, off the coast of Italy, and
in the Great Harbor of Syracuse. This outcome was of great consequence to the
rest of the war because it enabled a Spartan strategy of confronting Athens at sea.
The final years of the war were fought primarily in the eastern Aegean and saw
both sides conducting maritime power-projection operations around the islands
and the Hellespont region.
The use of maritime power for diplomatic and political purposes was crucial, especially for the Athenians, who relied so heavily on a maritime empire
for support. Sea power granted Athens the power to keep allies in line and dissuade them from rebellion. The Old Oligarch baldly states this as the case, and
Thucydides’s narrative of the war supports this analysis. When Athenian naval
power weakened, Sparta was able to draw away from Athens this base of support
and compromise the Athenians’ ability to fight. Aside from tribute collection
from allies, both sides used the threat of naval force to extort money out of third
powers. Athens began the war with a firmly entrenched maritime consciousness
that had seen naval force used for diplomatic means on a daily basis. Both sides
used navies as tools of diplomacy, especially as coercive forces with great reach.
Maritime trade was a critical Athenian vulnerability that required protection, especially as Spartan actions in Attica deepened Athenian dependence on
imports of food by sea. Athenian hegemony in the Aegean had helped suppress
piracy, but clearly there were plenty of would-be pirates and opportunists who
were willing and able to enlist with Sparta to attack Athenian shipping. This
state-sponsored piracy, akin to privateering in modern legal terms, demonstrated
Sparta’s recognition of the need to hit Athens at sea to damage its maritime trade.
As the war dragged on and Athens became reliant on grain imports from the
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Hellespont region and beyond, this theater became a crucial one in the conduct
of the war as Sparta tried to close the strait to Athens. It was Athens’s inability to
keep its SLOCs open and thereby feed itself that led to defeat.
The maritime operations that Greek forces conducted during the Peloponnesian War would have been impossible without navies’ ability to fight at sea.
Battle, on whatever scale, was of critical importance throughout the war. Possession of a strong fleet that was proven in battle allowed Athens to bully other states
by merely sailing its fleet around the Aegean and beyond. Without establishing
sea control with its fleet, Athens would not have been able to conduct a concerted
campaign of maritime power projection against Sparta and its allies. The Athenians certainly would not have gained a victory as stunning as the one at Pylos/
Sphacteria without the ability to defeat the Spartan fleet in battle. It was only
when Sparta took to the seas with a fleet that it was able to cause serious harm to
Athens, which caused the latter’s allies to rebel and threatened its maritime trade.
Sparta’s eventual transformation into a naval power, no matter how short-lived,
combined with Athens’s inability to counter this transformation effectively, was
the defining factor in the war.83 Once Sparta confronted Athens in battle at sea,
it directly threatened the Athenians with loss of the foundation of their power.
Far from being a sideshow of only secondary importance, the naval and
maritime dimension of the Peloponnesian War was of critical importance to the
conduct, and indeed the outcome, of the war. Too much has been made of technological limitations, prejudicing the proper study of maritime operations and
their impact on the history of the period. The Peloponnesian War was fought
primarily at and from the sea, and the outcome of the war was decided by the
ability of Athens and Sparta to use sea power effectively.

NOTES

		The author would like to acknowledge that
this research was supported by an Australian
Government Research Training Program
Scholarship. A note on citations: ancient
sources are referenced by book and chapter,
and sometimes section. All ancient references
are cited according to The Oxford Classical
Dictionary, 3rd ed. For instance, bk. 1, chap.
121, sec. 4 of Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War would be cited Thuc. 1.121.4.
All translations of ancient Greek texts are the
author’s unless otherwise noted.
1.	Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p. 16; Eric Grove,
The Future of Sea Power (London: Routledge,

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Winter2018Review.indb 135

1990), p. 234; Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine (Canberra: Sea Power
Centre–Australia, 2010), p. 100.
2.	Donald Kagan, The Fall of the Athenian Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1987), p.
41. Ionia refers to the area encompassing the
eastern Aegean Islands and the coastal cities
of Anatolia and western Turkey, home of the
Ionian Greeks.
3.	James Cable, The Political Influence of Naval
Force in History (Hampshire, U.K.: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 15–16; Michael A. Palmer,
Command at Sea: Naval Command and Control since the Sixteenth Century (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2005), pp. 19–38.

17

11/1/17 9:56 AM

136

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 8

4.	Palmer, Command at Sea, p. 17.
5.	For more on this subject, see J. F. Lazenby,
The First Punic War: A Military History (London: Routledge, 1996).
6.	Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides: A
Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian
War, ed. Robert B. Strassler (New York: Free
Press, 1996), 1.121.4. This edition is based on
the 1874 translation of Richard Crawley.
7.	Diodorus Siculus, Diodorus of Sicily in Twelve
Volumes, trans. C. H. Oldfather (Cambridge,
MA: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1935; repr. Loeb
Classical Library, 1976), 13.52.6.
8.	It is hard at this point to escape a comparison
with the First World War, where it was said
of the British admiral Sir John Jellicoe that
he was the only man who could lose the war
in an afternoon. Robert K. Massie, Castles of
Steel: Britain, Germany, and the Winning of
the Great War at Sea (New York: Ballantine,
2003), p. 56.
9.	This was the essence of the strategy after
war had broken out; Tirpitz’s Risikogedanke
(doctrine of risk) originally envisaged a German navy that eventually would be strong
enough to deter the Royal Navy from war
altogether. The outbreak of war in 1914 came
earlier than Tirpitz expected the German fleet
to achieve this (1915 was his earliest estimate;
the intervening period was called the “danger
period”), and thus the goal for German naval
strategy during the war became the whittling down of the Royal Navy until parity was
achieved. Corinthian thinking (as projected
by Thucydides, at least), held that defeating
a large Athenian naval contingent would
bring the Peloponnesian side closer to parity
with the Athenian fleet, thus negating the
Athenians’ greatest advantage. For Tirpitz’s
doctrine of risk, see Paul G. Halpern, A Naval
History of World War I (London: UCL, 1995),
pp. 2–5, and Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought:
Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great
War (London: Vintage, 2007), pp. 180–81.
10.	For a more detailed examination of the war
at sea during the Persian Wars, see Barry A.
Strauss, Salamis: The Greatest Naval Battle
of the Ancient World, 480 BC (London: Arrow, 2004), pp. 13–37, 91–253, and John R.
Hale, Lords of the Sea: The Epic Story of the
Athenian Navy and the Birth of Democracy
(London: Penguin, 2009), pp. 43–74.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/8

Winter2018Review.indb 136

11.	Other decisive naval battles that came later,
such as Actium, Lepanto, Trafalgar, and Tsushima, among others, had a clear influence on
German naval strategy. The Peloponnesian
War seems to be the first explicit expression
of decisive battle as a legitimate naval strategy,
no doubt taking as an example the Persian
Wars before it.
12.	Cable, The Political Influence of Naval Force in
History, p. 15.
13.	The very point Mahan was making in the
introduction to his groundbreaking Influence
of Sea Power upon History, 1660–1783 (New
York: Dover, 1890; repr. 1987), pp. 13–21.
14.	Thuc. 2.62.2.
15.	Thuc. 2.93–94; Diod. Sic. 12.49; Royal Australian Navy, Australian Maritime Doctrine,
p. 72; Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for
the Twenty-First Century, 3rd ed. (New York:
Routledge, 2013), pp. 145–50.
16.	The difference between sea control and sea
command is essentially a question of totality.
Sea command refers to the complete and
unfettered ability of one side to do on or by
the sea what it wishes, unopposed. This has
been seen only rarely throughout history,
although it could be argued that Athens
gained sea command at a certain point during
the Peloponnesian War, or even earlier, after
the Peace of Kallias—see below. For a more
in-depth discussion, see Till, Seapower, pp.
145–50.
17.	Thuc. 1.143.5; “The Old Oligarch,” PseudoXenophon’s Constitution of the Athenians,
trans. R. Osborne, 2nd ed. (London: London
Association of Classical Teachers, 2004),
2.14–16. Referring to the author as “the Old
Oligarch” rather than “Pseudo-Xenophon”
creates less confusion, as Xenophon had
nothing to do with the Constitution.
18.	Herodotus, The Persian Wars, trans. A. D.
Godley, Loeb Classical Library 119 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1925), 8.61.
19.	Thuc. 1.91–93.
20.	Plutarch, Lives, vol. 2, Themistocles and Camillus. Aristides and Cato Major. Cimon and
Lucullus, trans. Bernadotte Perrin, Loeb Classical Library 47 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Univ. Press, 1914), 19.2–3.
21.	“Old Oligarch,” Pseudo-Xenophon’s Constitution of the Athenians, 2.1.

18

11/1/17 9:56 AM

Nash: Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War

22.	
The “Old Oligarch”: The “Constitution of the
Athenians” Attributed to Xenophon, trans. J. L.
Marr and P. J. Rhodes, Aris & Phillips Classical Texts (Oxford, U.K.: Oxbow, 2008), p. 100.
23.	“Old Oligarch,” Pseudo-Xenophon’s Constitution of the Athenians, 2.4.
24.	Ibid., 2.2.
25.	Ibid., 2.3–5.
26.	Many scholars and military practitioners see
the idea of “operational art” as having consumed or confused the relationship between
strategy and tactics. The concept of operational art as it is known today is a recent one
and has provoked much debate, especially
after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq during
the early part of the twenty-first century.
For more discussion, see Hew Strachan, The
Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in
Historical Perspective (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), pp. 210–34, and
Justin Kelly and Michael J. Brennan, Alien:
How Operational Art Devoured Strategy (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic
Studies Institute, 2009), available at www
.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/. My current PhD work is concerned with sea power
and maritime strategy for the Greek classical
period (roughly 550–321 BCE), with the aim
of critically analyzing the role of sea power
during this period.
27.	Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2013), p. xi.
28.	Donald Kagan, “Athenian Strategy in the
Peloponnesian War,” in The Making of
Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin
Bernstein (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1994), p. 41; Donald Kagan, Thucydides: The
Reinvention of History (New York: Penguin,
2009), p. 85. Kagan’s views on Pericles and his
strategy have not changed since he wrote his
four-volume series on the Peloponnesian War
(1969–87).
29.	John Hale calls the Peace of Nicias a triumph
for Athens that would have gratified Pericles.
Hale, Lords of the Sea, p. 184. Platias and Koliopoulos call the peace favorable to Athens,
ruined only by the Sicilian expedition. Athanassios Platias and Constantinos Koliopoulos,
Thucydides on Strategy: Athenian and Spartan
Grand Strategies in the Peloponnesian War and

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Winter2018Review.indb 137

NA S H

137

Their Relevance Today (London: Hurst, 2010),
p. 56.
30.	Thuc. 2.17.4, 2.18–21.
31.	Kagan, Thucydides, p. 80.
32.	Henry D. Westlake, “Seaborne Raids in Periclean Strategy,” Classical Quarterly 39, nos.
3/4 (July/October 1945), p. 81; J. F. Lazenby,
The Peloponnesian War: A Military Study
(London: Routledge, 2004), p. 253.
33.	Thuc. 2.21–22.
34.	The idea that the Athenian population
would be so despondent at the destruction
and ravaging of their land that effectively it
would cause them to capitulate by engaging
in a hopeless land battle is reminiscent of the
underlying assumption in the early twentieth
century that the use of strategic bombing in
war would bring a nation to its knees. As the
wholesale destruction of German and Japanese cities at the hands of Allied conventional
bombers showed, this was flawed logic. J. E.
Lendon proposes that the actions of the first
six years of the war were aimed at damaging
the honor of the other side, striking blows
more moral than physical. It is an interesting
proposal—but not terribly convincing. The
fears that Spartan allies expressed during the
rebuilding of the Athenian walls seem to be
concerned with damage not to honor but to
their property and livelihoods. Lendon does,
however, seem to concede that Athenian
actions included offensive operations rather
than pure defense. See J. E. Lendon, Song of
Wrath: The Peloponnesian War Begins (New
York: Basic Books, 2010), pp. 107–283.
35.	Thuc. 2.22.2. See also I. G. Spence, “Perikles
and the Defence of Attika during the Peloponnesian War,” Journal of Hellenic Studies
110 (November 1990), pp. 91–109.
36.	“London Fragments,” in Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, trans. P. R. McKechnie and S. J. Kern
(Warminster, PA: Aris & Phillips, 1988),
17.4–5; Victor Davis Hanson, Warfare and
Agriculture in Classical Greece, 2nd ed.
(Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1998), p.
237.
37.	Thuc. 7.27.3–5.
38.	Hanson, Warfare and Agriculture in Classical
Greece, p. 147. Hanson’s argument does not
convince everyone. James Thorne argues
that the example of the ravaging of Attica is

19

11/1/17 9:56 AM

138

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Naval War College Review, Vol. 71 [2018], No. 1, Art. 8

not representative of the economic impact of
ravaging in classical Greece, because Athens
alone could bear such hardship. If anything,
this argument reinforces the effectiveness
of sea power during the war. See James A.
Thorne, “Warfare and Agriculture: The
Economic Impact of Devastation in Classical
Greece,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies
42, no. 3 (2001), pp. 225–53.
39.	As Kagan finally admits at the end of his survey of the Archidamian War. Donald Kagan,
The Archidamian War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
Univ. Press, 1974), p. 333. However, Lazenby
comes to the strange conclusion that Sparta
still did more damage to Athens than Athens
did to Sparta with this strategy—a conclusion with no solid foundation. Lazenby, The
Peloponnesian War, p. 253.
40.	Thuc. 2.25.1; 2.26–27; 2.30.2.
41.	Diodorus’s account gives the impression that
it was the Peloponnesians who suffered most
from the raiding of the first year; they were
“terrified” by the Athenians “ravaging many
places of the coastline.” Diod. Sic. 12.42.7–8.
B. X. de Wet is one of the few authors who
also come to the conclusion that Athens did
more material damage. His work is also an
early, yet overlooked, example of a scholar
arguing for a strong offensive element to
Athenian war strategy. B. X. de Wet, “The
So-Called Defensive Policy of Pericles,” Acta
Classica 12 (1969), pp. 103–19.
42.	Plutarch, Lives, vol. 3, Pericles and Fabius
Maximus. Nicias and Crassus, trans. Bernadotte Perrin, Loeb Classical Library 65
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1916),
34.2.
43.	Thuc. 2.80.1.
44.	Thuc. 4.53.3; Plutarch, Per. 6.4.
45.	Thuc. 4.57.4; Kagan, The Archidamian War,
p. 261.
46.	This refers to the outcome of the campaign rather than the Athenians’ landing
at Pylos. Luck is a convenient explanation
for Thucydides, whose distaste for Cleon is
well known. Rather than credit Cleon with
a well-earned victory resulting from good
leadership, it seems that Thucydides opted to
ascribe the victory to luck.

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/8

Winter2018Review.indb 138

47.	A very capable politician and general, not the
famed orator of the fourth century. Kagan,
The Archidamian War, p. 222.
48.	Thuc. 1.142.4.
49.	Platias and Koliopoulos, Thucydides on
Strategy, p. 49.
50.	Thuc. 4.3.1–3. Helots made up the population
of Messenia, the region Sparta conquered and
enslaved into working the land on Sparta’s
behalf. Many consider the Spartan military
regime as conceived primarily to ensure a
strong military that could keep the helots
suppressed in perpetual serfdom.
51.	Thuc. 4.6, 4.8.1–2.
52.	Thuc. 4.8.3–8. For more details on the Pylos
campaign, see Lazenby, The Peloponnesian
War, pp. 67–79.
53.	Thuc. 4.15–16.
54.	Thuc. 4.40.1. Hornblower calls this a typical
rhetorical superlative. Simon Hornblower,
A Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 2, Books
IV–V.24 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
1996), p. 194. Nevertheless, the surrender of
Spartan hoplites in such number was unheard
of to that point, and certainly flies in the face
of the vaunted reputation of Spartan hoplites,
epitomized by their performance in the battle
of Thermopylae in 480.
55.	Thuc. 4.41.1.
56.	Thuc. 4.41.1–3; Diod. Sic. 12.63.5.
57.	Thuc. 4.45.
58.	Thuc. 4.49. J. B. Salmon, Wealthy Corinth: A
History of the City to 338 BC (Oxford, U.K.:
Clarendon, 1984), p. 318.
59.	Thuc. 4.55.1–4.
60.	Thuc. 4.56. To paraphrase Jackie Fisher, the
Athenian army was a projectile fired by the
Athenian navy.
61.	Thuc. 3.86.3–4.
62.	Thuc. 4.80.1–2.
63.	Plutarch, Per. 20.
64.	Ibid., 11.4.
65.	Russell Meiggs, The Athenian Empire (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon, 1979), p. 206; Samuel
K. Eddy, “Athens’ Peacetime Navy in the Age
of Perikles,” Greek, Roman, and Byzantine

20

11/1/17 9:56 AM

Nash: Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War

Studies 9, no. 2 (1968), pp. 142–55. Although
Plutarch’s language makes it clear that it was
sixty ships under pay for the entire eightmonth period, it seems more reasonable to
think that a portion of the sixty ships were
sent out in rotation throughout an eightmonth period. This would ensure a healthy
training rotation of ships and crews while
maintaining a presence throughout the Aegean at a lower cost than having all sixty out
at once, although this perhaps occurred for
some periods.
66.	Meiggs, The Athenian Empire, p. 206.
67.	The scope of this article leaves no room for
proper explanation of or speculation about
why such overt and frequent demonstrations
of sea power did not lead to any sort of naval
arms race. A cursory examination suggests
that money was the key factor, navies being
capital and manpower intensive. Athens’s
tribute-paying allies contributed money rather than ships, so there were few large standing
naval forces in the Aegean. Thus, one can
glimpse tensions concerning naval armaments in the initial conflict over Corcyra,
each wanted the city’s very large fleet between
Athens and Sparta on its side.
68.	Thuc. 1.44.
69.	Thuc. 1.45.
70.	Thuc. 2.23.
71.	Donald Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press,
1969), pp. 244–45.
72.	Hornblower, Books IV–V.24, p. 90.
73.	Thuc. 2.69.1.
74.	Thucydides, The Landmark Thucydides;
Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War,

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2018

Winter2018Review.indb 139

NA S H

139

trans. Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1954;
repr. 1972).
75.	Thuc. 2.32.
76.	In 430. Thuc. 2.67.4; Thomas Kelly,
“Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War,” American Historical Review
87, no. 1 (February 1982), p. 32 note 20.
77.	Thuc. 8.35.1–2. The location of classical
Cnidus is somewhat disputed. Simon Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides, vol. 3,
Books 5.25–8.109 (New York: Oxford Univ.
Press, 2008), pp. 849–51.
78.	Thuc. 8.35.3.
79.	Xenophon, Hellenica: Books 1–4, trans.
Carleton L. Brownson, Loeb Classical Library
88 (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1918), 1.1.36.
80.	Peter Garnsey, Famine and Food Supply in the
Graeco-Roman World: Responses to Risk and
Crisis (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 1988), pp. 121–22.
81.	Xen., Hell. 1.1.35.
82.	Thuc. 8.96.1–2.
83.	The topic of Sparta’s transformation into a sea
power as a phenomenon is examined more
thoroughly by Barry Strauss in an interesting volume on maritime transformations
throughout history (with a focus on China’s
modern transformation into a sea power).
Barry Strauss, “Sparta’s Maritime Moment,”
in China Goes to Sea: Maritime Transformation in Comparative Historical Perspective, ed.
Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and
Carnes Lord (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute
Press, 2009), pp. 33–61.

21

11/1/17 9:56 AM

